(http://lullianarts.net/Ars-Magna/1-2-3-4.htm#Part_2_-_The_Figures )

2. Here are the principles of this art: Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue, Truth, Glory, Difference, Concordance, Contrariety, Beginning, Middle, End, Majority, Equality and Minority. We call them general inasmuch as the different kinds of goodness in all other sciences apply to one general goodness, and likewise their greatness applies to one general greatness and so with the rest, each in its own way.

3. Further, this science is general because of its general questions that are general to all other questions: all are implied in these ten, namely: Whether? What? Of What? Why? How much? What Quality? When? Where? How? With What?

4. Further, this art is general because its principles and rules are general, as shown below. Just as the term "proposition", taken in its general meaning, is common to every kind of proposition, likewise these principles, when combined with each other and taken in a general sense, are general to all particular compound principles. To dispel any doubt about this, I say that all other principles are particular as compared to the principles of this art, for instance great goodness, a compound principle, is common to the goodness of Peter, of William, of horses and so forth.

5. This art has thirteen parts, namely the alphabet, figures, definitions, rules, table, evacuating figure three, multiplying figure four, the mixture of principles and rules, nine subjects, application, questions, how to learn this art and how to teach it.

Part 1 - The Alphabet
This is the alphabet of this art
B. stands for goodness, difference, whether? God, justice, avarice
C. stands for greatness, concordance, what? angels, prudence, gluttony
D. stands for duration, contrariety, of what? heaven, fortitude, lust
E. stands for power, beginning, why? man, temperance, conceit
F. stands for wisdom, middle, how much? imagination, faith, accidy
G. stands for will, end, what quality? senses, hope, envy
H. stands for virtue, majority, when? vegetation, charity, wrath
I. stands for truth, equality, where? elements, patience, lies
K. stands for glory, minority, how and with what? instruments, compassion, inconstancy

2. The alphabet must be known by heart, as without it the artist has no way of putting this art to practical use. It is included in this art in order to signify the principles and questions whose content serves to solve problems at hand with true intellectual certitude removed from any doubt.

Part 2 - The Figures

Chapter 1: The First Figure The First Figure signified by the letter A 1. There are four figures, as shown . The letter A stands for the first figure which is circular and divided into nine cameras. B is in the first camera, C in the second, and so forth. The figure is called circular because subjects and predicates are mutually convertible, as when we say "great goodness, good greatness, eternal greatness, great eternity, goodness is God, God is good," and so on. This circulation allows the artist to discern between what is convertible and what is not convertible: for instance God and good can convert, but not God and angel, nor angels and goodness, nor the goodness and greatness of angels; and likewise with the other terms. 2. All things are implied by this figure, for instance we can say: "God is good, great and eternal etc. and angels are good, great and durable, and avarice is not good but evil," and so forth. 3. The proper and appropriated qualities of subjects and predicates are known through this figure. Proper qualities, for instance: God is good, great etc. and angels have innate goodness, greatness etc. Appropriated qualities, for instance: evil angels have appropriated moral evil; fire has good and great dryness on account of earth; man has good, great moral prudence, justice, etc. 4. The artist must habitually visualise this figure and apply it as shown to questions so that the intellect can really and truly attain the truth with it.
Chapter 2 - The Second Figure signified by the letter T 5. The second figure consists in three triangles, namely difference, concordance, contrariety etc. as shown. Above the angles of difference, concordance and contrariety, the terms "sensual and sensual", "sensual and intellectual" and "intellectual and intellectual" are written to signify the difference that exists between some sensual beings and others, like one body and another, and between sensual and intellectual beings like the body and soul, and between some intellectual beings and others like God and angels. And the same applies to concordance and contrariety. 6. Above the angle of beginning, the terms "cause", "quantity" and "time" are written. "Cause" stands for substantial principles, namely efficient, material, formal and final. Quantity and time signify accidental principles like the nine predicates and other similar things. 7. Above the angle of the middle the terms "conjunction", "measure" and "extremes" are written and they signify three species of medium, namely the medium of conjunction, the medium of measure and the medium between extremes. A medium of conjunction is, for instance, a nail that joins two boards. A medium of measure is like the center of a circle, equally distant from every point of the circumference. A medium between extremes is like a line between two points. 8. Above the angle of the end, the terms "privation", "termination" and "perfection" (or final cause) are written to denote three species of end. The end of privation is like death that puts an end to life. The end of termination is like the boundary of a kingdom or a field. The end of perfection or final cause is like God who is the cause and end of all things. 9. Above the angles of majority, equality and minority are written the terms "between substance and substance", meaning that one substance is greater than another, like human substance is greater in goodness, virtue, etc. than the substance of stones. "Between substance and accident" means that substance is greater than accident: for instance, the substance of man is greater than his quantity etc. And "between accident and accident" means that some accidents are greater than others: for instance, understanding is greater than sensing; and the same can be said in its own way about minority in opposition to majority. And there is equality between one substance and another: for instance, men and stones equally belong to the genus of substance. And there is equality between one accident and another, for instance understanding and loving equally belong to the genus of accidents. And there is equality between substance and accident: for instance, quantity and its substantial subject are equal in extension and surface. 10. The green triangle consisting of difference, concordance and contrariety is general to all things because everything in existence has some difference, concordance or contrariety. Whatever exists is implicitly contained in this triangle. Difference is more general than concordance and contrariety because more things can be different than concordant or contrary, like Peter and Martin who differ numerically and belong to the same species, but with contrary moral characters, as one is just and the other is unjust, and so forth. Difference causes plurality and concordance causes unity: whereas difference distinguishes one thing from another, concordance unites several things into one, and contrariety corrupts and dissolves things. And as the green triangle is found in all natural subjects, so the intellect discourses mentally by discerning and conserving the three said species of difference, concordance and contrariety while descending and ascending through them. The intellect is simply and objectively general with difference as well as with concordance and contrariety; but when it focuses on the ladder formed by the three species, it is neither altogether general nor altogether specific, as when we say "between sensual and sensual," etc. But when it mentally focuses on individuals, it is altogether particular. 11. The red triangle consisting of beginning, middle and end is general to all things because it contains everything, since everything in existence is in the beginning, middle, or end so that nothing can exist without these terms. A beginning, or principle is something followed by everything else. There is no way that a universal principle can exist, be it natural or moral, unless it includes within itself its own intrinsic active principle, passive principle and functional principle. Now heat cannot naturally exist without the heater with its heatable and their heating; and likewise a principle cannot naturally exist without its three natural intrinsic principles. The artist must know that the three intrinsic correlatives of each universal principle are its essence's own subjective causal properties, and he must know how to distinguish these essential correlatives from the morally acquired accidental ones. Causal principles are necessary whereas accidental ones are contingent and meant for well being. In this way, the artist must ascend and descend from the universal to the particular and back. 12. The middle, or medium, like the beginning, is universal: an agent always begins with the beginning, then mediates through the medium whereby it joins together distinct entities into one compound or mixture. Acts are measured with the medium of measurement, for instance: the intellect measures its act of understanding situated in the middle between the intellective and its intelligible, in the same way that a seer measures his act of seeing, or a producer measures his act of production, or a judge his act of judgment. The middle of extremes implies essence and continuity: goodness, for instance, is a simple essence that stands in the middle between greatness and duration and contains its own intrinsic act of bonifying in the middle between the bonifier and the bonified, where all three are one undivided goodness, which is not the case with moral goodness. These three species of the middle, or medium are a ladder on which the intellect ascends and descends as it investigates the middle in things. Likewise, with the end, the efficient cause brings things to repose in the ultimate terminus, but they can find no consummation at all in a privative terminus that deprives them. And in the end of termination, disparate beings repose in disparate ways. This kind of investigation is very useful and a light for the intellect to grasp the final purpose of things. 13. In the saffron triangle we understand that there is one universal majority above all particular majorities. With majority, agents do major things just as they begin things with the beginning, and the same applies to equality and minority. Substantial goodness and other substantial principles are associated with majority, whereas accidental goodness, etc. are associated with minority. The intrinsic bonifier (active goodness), bonified (passive goodness) and bonifying (act of goodness) in substantial goodness are essentially equal and the same applies to intellect and will, and also to igneity (essential fire), etc. as well as to the equality of causal and moral accidents. The intellect ascends and descends through these three species to grasp the truth about things generally related to majority, equality and minority in substance and accident. This ascent and descent is a powerful artificial technique for acquiring science. 14. We have described the second figure as the intellect's instrument for working with the first figure because it distinguishes between goodness and greatness etc. with difference and matches them in concordance and proceeds likewise with the other principles, each in its own way. Further, with difference, the intellect distinguishes between the bonifier, bonified and bonifying in the essence of goodness and with concordance it matches them and finds that they are identical in essence naturally but not morally since moral difference is not innate, but acquired from contingent principles.
Chapter 3: The Third Figure 15. The third figure is composed of the first and second figures and has thirty-six cameras as shown. Each camera has two letters, the first has BC, the second BD and so on. We say it is composed of two figures because its letter B stands for the letter B in both the first and second figure, and its C stands for C in the first figure and C in the second figure, and so on. In this art, this figure is intended to signify how each principle applies to the others as we apply C, D, ... K to B in order to learn about B through C, D, etc. and apply what we learn here to any question regarding B. We proceed with C as we did with B and combine C with B, D, and so on to camera CK. And so on through the rest of the cameras to camera IK, as we see fit, in whatever way we want to multiply many reasons for the same conclusion. All this is done by considering the meanings of the cameras and applying them to the issue at hand. 17. This figure shows how to descend to particulars gradually in four ways. 1 - First, with camera BC we say: "Goodness has great difference and concordance". 2 - In considering the angle of difference, the intellect gradually descends to particulars when it understands the difference and concordance between one sensual being and another, etc. as explained in the second figure. 3 - The intellect descends further when it considers that there is good difference and concordance between fire and air as they agree in heat. 4 - The intellect descends as it understands the good difference and concordance between the bonifier, bonified and bonifying that all belong to one essence of goodness. And what we said about BC applies to the other cameras of this figure.
Chapter 4 - The Fourth Figure 18. The fourth figure has three circles as shown, it includes the first, second and third figures; and the principles of the Table are found in it as camera BCD is used for column BCD of the Table, camera BCE for column BCE etc. 19. In this art, this figure provides the sequence of the Table where many reasons and conclusions are found by applying the said reasons to a single conclusion in view of what the letters mean when applied to the issue at hand while avoiding anything inconsistent with reason or contradictory to the said meanings. 20. The second circle shows how to find the minor premise of the conclusion, as C (or some other letter) stands in the middle between B and D that both participate in greatness. Likewise, contrariety in D between B and E does not allow goodness and power to associate. Thus, a concordant or connecting minor premise leads to an affirmative conclusion whereas a contrary or dissociative minor premise leads to a negative conclusion.

Part 3 - The Definitions
1. The third part is about defining the principles, goodness is defined as follows:
Goodness is the being on account of which good does good and thus it is good to be and evil not to be.
Greatness is the being on account of which goodness, eternity etc. are great, encompassing all extremes of being. And by "etc." we mean the other principles although not absolutely because if we say that in God there is goodness, greatness, etc. we do not mean that there is any majority, minority or contrariety in God.
Duration is that on account of which goodness, greatness etc. are lasting.
Power is that on account of which goodness, greatness etc. can exist and act.
Wisdom is a property with which the wise understand.
Will is that on account of which goodness, greatness etc. are desirable, and on account of which good, great etc. substantial beings are desirable.
Virtue gives rise to the unity of goodness, greatness etc. in one good, great, etc. substance.
Truth is that which is true about goodness, greatness etc.
Glory is the delight in which goodness, greatness etc. rest.
Difference is that whereby goodness, greatness etc. are clear reasons without any confusion, and whereby the bonifier and the bonified with their bonifying are without confusion.
Concordance is that on account of which goodness, greatness etc. agree in unity and plurality.
Contrariety is mutual resistance caused by divergent ends.
The beginning is that which is relatively prior to everything else.
The middle is the subject through which the end influences the beginning and the beginning reciprocally influences the end so that it naturally participates in both extremes.
The end is that in which the beginning rests.
Majority is an image of the immensity of greatness, goodness, eternity and the other divine dignities.
Equality is the subject where the final concordance of goodness, greatness etc, reposes.
Minority is being close to nothingness.
2. Some principles are substantial and others are accidental, but contrariety is always an accident. Substantial principles need substantial definitions and accidental ones require accidental definitions. For instance, substantial goodness needs a substantial definition whereby the agent substantially bonifies what is bonified; and accidental goodness needs an accidental definition whereby the agent accidentally bonifies what is bonified.
3. We should note that definitions can be made in several ways, all of which are included in two modes, and each mode has four species. The first mode consists in the efficient, material, formal and final causes. The efficient cause, for instance: God is our creator and savior. The formal cause, for instance: form is the being under which matter is passive. And matter is the being upon which the agent acts. The end is defined as above.

The second mode is shown in rule C, in the second chapter of part four.

4. The above definitions belong to these two modes. A form is defined by its act when we say "the elemental power is a being that functions by producing elemented things, the vegetative power by producing vegetal things, the sensitive power by sensing, the imaginative power by imagining and the rational power by reasoning". The same applies to the efficient cause, as we can say that man is a man-producing being, and lions are beings that produce lions, and fire is the being that ignites, and so on. This way of defining things is very easy and useful. And the definitions made with rule C are very easy, useful and clear because the thing defined converts into its definition and vice versa: like goodness is a being that functions by doing good, and it is a being that has its own innate bonifier, bonified and bonifying. Goodness in a subject is the being that bonifies what is bonified. Further, goodness is a being that has action in its subject.
And what we said about goodness also applies to the other principles.

5. The artist can use the said two modes to define anything. But apart from the art, there is another confused and prolific way of defining things, when definitions are made haphazardly at one's pleasure, with no regard for the proper and appropriated definitions of the subject and predicate, as when we say: "Man is a rational animal, and also the only animal that rides on horseback, writes and so forth".

6. Further, compound definitions can be made by defining one principle in combination with another, as for instance: "Great goodness is the being on account of which great good does great good". And if we add eternity, we get "Great eternal goodness is the being on account of which great eternal good does great eternal good". In this way the artist can use primordial, necessarily true principles to make demonstrations that cannot be made in any other way. Yet another way to make compound definitions is as follows: "Goodness is the being on account of which good does good; greatness is the being on account of which great beings do great things", and so forth.

7. To further explain the definitions of the principles, the artist declares their natural properties. Goodness can have no natural properties without its innate bonifier, bonified and bonifying, nor can greatness have any natural properties without its innate magnifier, magnified and magnifying, nor can eternity have any natural properties without its innate eternalizer that eternalizes eternalized being; and likewise with the other principles. If the principles had no natural properties, goodness would not be the being on account of which good naturally does good, nor would duration be the being on account of which goodness, greatness etc. are lasting. If the definitions are destroyed, then there is no principle or universe left. But this is false, as we know by experience that the universe exists.

8. Note that the principle of wisdom refers to intellect in rational substance, but in any being that is not rational it means instinct, and will means appetite.

9. Now there are those who dare to attack our principles with canine fangs and serpentine tongue, as they disparage and slander our definitions. However, the art has principles that mutually help each other, for instance when someone says: "If greatness is the being on account of which goodness is great, then all goodness must be equally great;" this can be refuted with the principles of majority, minority and contrariety which do not allow every kind of goodness to be equally great.

Part 4 - The Rules
1. There are ten rules, namely: whether, what, etc. as previously shown in the alphabet. These rules are ten general questions applicable to any enquiry. And when an enquiry is made with them, the subject is clarified, colored and displayed to the intellect according to the essence and nature of the rule, like a word declined in grammar: just like all Latin nouns can be declined in five all-inclusive declensions, as it were, every conceivable question is included in these ten and can be reduced to them and regulated by them on accont of their general nature. And as the questions are general, so are their species: just as goodness, for instance, is entirely general with its general bonifier, bonified and bonifying without which it cannot be entirely general, so are the ten questions of this art general on account of their general species.
Chapter 1 - Rule B
2. Rule B is "whether?" and applies to possibility, namely to finding out whether the thing inquired about exists or not. Here, the issue of possibility can be approached with mere faith or belief, or else by first supposing that the truth may lie in either the affirmative or the negative answer.
3. Rule B has three species, namely doubt, affirmation and negation. With the first species we must suppose that something may either exist or not exist so that the intellect is not obstinately bound to an opinion, but instead seeks to investigate the matter until it has determined whether the true answer is affirmative or negative. And this process is always conditional to adopting the solution which is best remembered, understood snd desired as the true one, if it is supported by the principles, their definitions and the rest of the rules. For instance if we ask whether the intellect exists, the answer is clearly positive because the intellect's existence can be remembered, understood and loved more than its non existence: this can be demonstrated by investigating the issue with the said principles.

4. We must choose the solution which is best remembered, understood and loved, in other words we must choose that which is remembered, understood and loved more, and not less. Whenever an affirmative or negative choice is made even though the subject is less worthy of being remembered, understood and loved, this choice is neither philosophical nor scientific, but sooner based on faith and belief. And whenever a choice is made with greater intelligibility in accordance with greater remembering and loving, true and necessary science is produced, where the intellect truly reposes because it truly attains its object. This sums up the entire truth about rule B.

Chapter 2 - Rule C
5. Rule C, or the rule of quiddity is a resource for defining things, as previously mentioned in the definitions of the principles (Chapter 3 #3). This rule has four species. The first species defines things so the thing defined is convertible with its definition - let us say, for instance: "The intellect is the being of its essence," or "The intellect is the being whose proper function is to understand things," and likewise with other definitions, each in its own way.
6. The second species asks what a thing has in itself essentially and naturally, without which it cannot exist, for instance: "What does the intellect essentially and naturally have in itself, without which it cannot exist?" And the answer is that it has its own innate knower, knowledge and knowing. Thus, the intellect actively knows with its own innate knower; it is passive with its own innate knowledge wherein it knows objects external to its own essence; its own innate, intrinsic act is the act of knowing and all three correlatives are one single intellect in one undivided essence. And the intellect characterizes its knowing of external objects with its own intrinsic knowing just as it characterizes external knowables in its own intrinsic knowable part. And this is necessary for the proper mutual correspondence of active and passive acts, both intrinsic and extrinsic. What I said applies to the intellect in practice but not in theory, where the intellect is simply what it is, like a whole that exists on account of its co-essential parts.

7. What we say about the intellect describes its universal and particular character. It is universal because it can understand all kinds of things, its innate knowable part is universal because it can receive in sequence all external things knowable to it, and likewise, its intrinsic knowing is universal in its successive extrinsic acts. The truth of what we say about the intellect is sufficiently proved by the definitions of the principles and by rule B: now if this were not true, the intellect would not have any great goodness, duration, etc. nor could it operate naturally in universal and particular ways, nor would there be any truth at all in rule B, which would be completely false.

8. The third species asks what something is in other things, and the answer is that in other things, a thing takes on different general qualities: the intellect is active as the knower attaining an object and it is passive in receiving species; it is great when it has a great and difficult object, true when it truly understands, false when its understanding is false, it is necessarily confined to memory when it merely believes, and it finds freedom and repose in true knowledge.

9. The fourth species asks what something has in other things, for instance: "What does the intellect have in its object?" And the answer is that it has action and passion, as shown in the third species. And it has action in Grammar, Logic and Geometry, and passion in the positive sciences. And it has goodness in moral virtue, guilt in sin, and so on with the other qualities.

10. We have described rule C and its species. And the above example of the intellect applies to corporeal subjects in their own way: for instance, fire functions substantially and per se by igniting, and accidentally by heating. Fire has its own igniter, ignitable and igniting wherever it is active in elemented compounds, for instance when it ignites a lamp or a pepper corn. And the same applies to the vegetative power in vegetal bodies, the sensitive power in bodies endowed with senses, and the imaginative power in bodies endowed with imagination. But in the heavens this is not so, as stars do not produce other stars, nor do angels give birth to other angels because they do not generate anything substantially since they are incorruptible and indivisible substances. With regard to God, this must be understood in yet another way, following the definitions and nature of divine goodness, infinity and eternity.

Chapter 3 - Rule D
11. The third rule inquires into material consistency and has three species. The first inquires into origins, for instance: "From what does the intellect originate?" And the answer is that the intellect exists on its own because it is neither made nor produced from anything else, but created, as it did not exist before and now it does.
12. The second species asks what a thing is made of, or consists of, as for instance: "What is the intellect made of?" And we answer that it consists of its own coessential principles, namely its knower, knowable and knowing. And likewise, man consists of body and soul, nails are made of iron, and so forth.

13. The third species asks about ownership, for instance: "To whom does the intellect belong?" And "To whom does the kingdom belong?" And the answer is that the intellect belongs to man, and the kingdom belongs to the king. So this rule serves to inquire into the origin, consistency and ownership of things.

14. We applied rule D to the intellect and we can apply it likewise to other subjects, each in its own way, for instance: the universe, by the first species, exists on its own and is not made of any other pre-existing principle. And the second species says that it consists of universal and substantial form and matter: every particular form derives from this form and all particular matter derives from this matter. And by the third species, this universe belongs to God who created it.

15. The same applies to universal and substantial goodness, greatness, etc. as general and primordial principles. By the second species of this rule, goodness consists of the bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying; greatness consists of its universal magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying, and likewise with the other principles each in its own way because they all have such parts. And we say the same about every particular goodness, greatness, etc. as all particular goodness, greatness, etc. derives from the said universal goodness, greatness, etc. And the same applies, in another way, to elements and elemented things. However, we cannot apply the second species in this way to man because man is composed of body and soul that differ in genus and nature as corporeal and incorporeal substance. And likewise with substance and accidents: for instance, quantity is not of the essence of substance, but it is the quantifying habit of substance. Likewise, quality qualifies substance and so with the other accidents. Now substance and accidents enter into the composition of all bodies, because nothing can exist as a body without composition.

16. By the third species of this rule, accidents belong to substance because they do not exist per se but only on account of substance; this is because accidents are not composed of form and matter, whereas substance can exist per se because it has form and matter. And accidents are likenesses, figures and instruments of substance.

17. Further, by the first species, accidents exist on their own because they are primordial: for instance, the prime species of quantity exists on its own as a primordial and general thing from which all other quantities derive. This primordial quantity is undivided in itself, but divides into many particular quantities just like general quality divides into many particular qualities. This division proceeds accidentally, as substance is divided and fragmented into the species, differences and numbers it generates. Now, science deals with various accidents, for instance: Logic deals with connecting second intentions to prime intentions. And so with mechanical accidents, as when shaping wood into a box, or stones into a tower, and other things in their own way.

18. The artist uses this rule of the art to inquire into the prime origins of things with the first species, their composition with the second and their domination and possession with the third species. And this rule applies to all things in general.

19. We have dealt with rule D, and the truth of what we said is self evident and adequately proved by all definitions of the principles and by rules B and C. Now, if substantial goodness, intellect etc. did not consist of parts by the second species, if there were no such species, there could be no substantial goodness as it would have no constituent parts. Consequently, it would not exist per se, but rather as an accident that has no second species of D. Nor could goodness be a substantial reason, nor would good substantially produce good from the essence of goodness: and thus, some goodness would not be substantial, but merely accidental. This would destroy the definitions of greatness, duration, etc. And the same applies to the other principles.

This would also mean that everything is accidental, which is an impossibility and contrary to rules B and C. With this doctrine and method artists can prove one truth with another by applying the definitions of the principles as well as rules B and C to what was said about D.

Chapter 4 - Rule E
20. The fourth question is "why" and has two species: namely existence and action. Let us ask, for instance, "Why is there intellect?"
With regard to existence, the answer is that the intellect exists because it consists of its own intellective, intelligible and intellection, like a whole is what it is on account of its own co-essential constituent parts. With regard to action, the intellect exists in order to understand things and move to a purposeful end. And its final purpose is to understand truths about God and other beings, and enable man to acquire the habit of science.
21. With this rule we inquire into the reasons why things exist. And the intellect's formal existence in the first species of rule E is proved true by the definitions of goodness, greatness, etc. and by rule B and the second species of rules C and D, without which the intellect could not naturally exist or act.

22. Further, the things said about the intellect can equally be said about substance, as it exists on account of its causes and occasions. Its causes are formal, material, efficient and final, and its occasions are its disposition, habit, contingency, and other accidents. The rule of "why?" relates to genera, species, individuals, liberal and mechanical arts, virtues and vices, etc.

Chapter 5 - Rule F
23. The fifth question is about quantity and has two species: namely simple and compound quantity. For instance, we ask: "In what quantity does the intellect exist?" In its essential simplicity, the answer is that the intellect exists in the quantity of its essential being. As for composition, the intellect exists in the quantity of its existence and action, namely its constituent innate knower, knowable and knowing.
24. This rule serves to inquire about the measurement and number of things. The truth of what we said about the intellect can be sufficiently proved by the definitions of goodness, greatness, etc. and by the second species of rules C and D: now goodness as a simple essence and form has continuous quantity generally and naturally disparate from that of other essences; but as a reason for good to produce good, it has discrete nature on account of its active, passive and functioning correlatives which are the bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying whose influx influences foreign and discrete quantities in composition as they enter into individuated subjects whose goodness has both continuous and discrete quantity.

25. The things said about goodness can also be said about other higher forms that cause continuous and discrete quantities in things below, for instance: a stone is habituated with one continuous quantity and with the discrete quantities it has on account of the elemental essences composing it. Likewise, plants are composed of elementative and vegetative powers, and man is composed of the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative and rational powers. And likewise with artificial things like towers or ships, although they are not as homogeneously continuous as natural subjects, because quantity is more discrete in the integral parts of artificial things.

Chapter 6 - Rule G
26. The sixth question is about quality and has two species: namely proper and appropriated quality. For instance, with the first species we can ask: "What qualities does the intellect have?" And the answer is that the intellect has the same qualities as those of its own intellectivity, intelligibility and intellection. And with the second species we answer that the intellect has the qualities of its habit, which are those of its appropriated intelligibility in the action it exercises in its own intelligibility through which it attains other intelligible beings. And likewise if we ask what quality fire has on account of its proper quality of heat, the answer is that it has a heating quality. And on account of its dryness, a quality that fire appropriates from earth, fire is passively dried; but in air, fire is an actively drying element with its dryness; and likewise with the other elements.
27. This rule serves to inquire about proper and appropriated qualities. Proper qualities are higher causes and appropriated qualities are lower causes: for instance, the heat of fire is a higher quality and its dryness is lower. With this rule, the artist inquires to find out which, of the subject and object, is higher or lower. And I call proper qualities proper passions, and appropriated qualities I call appropriated passions.

Chapter 7 - Rule H
28. The seventh rule or question asks about time and has as many species as the second, third, ninth and tenth rules. And we made this rule because the essence of time is very difficult to understand. First, let us apply rule H to rule C and ask with the first species of rule C: "When does the intellect exist?" And the answer is that the intellect exists when the being of its essence exists. And with the second species we answer that it exists when it has its coessential parts. And with the third species we say that the intellect exists in other things whenever it acts in them, like the practical intellect in its subjects. The fourth species asks: "When does the intellect have something in other things?" The answer is that in other things, the intellect has its understanding of their likenesses. And we have said enough about the intellect with rule C.
29. With the first species of rule D we answer that time is a primordial essence, neither produced nor engendered by any other essence. Just as prime matter is not derived from any other matter, prime form does not come from any other form. Time as a primordial entity is a prime form that causes its own particular forms: days, hours, etc. By the second species of rule D, time consists of the temporificative, temporificable and temporification by means of motion containing its own innate motificative, motificable and motification. This does not mean that time and motion are essentially identical, but it means that they are two habits with which subjects are habituated and subjected to passions. With the third species of rule D we say that time is subjected to the doer in the doable and the doing as substance assumes the habit of time naturally and/or morally.

30. By the modal rule we understand that time consists in a habit the mover has with its movable (or moved) object and the act of moving, where time exists as one part of substance within another. And the likeness, or figure of time consists of past, present and future; just as the habit of heat consists in the heater with the heatable - or heated - and the act of heating, while motion consists in the mover with the movable - or moved - and the act of moving.

31. By the second, or instrumental rule K, time is an instrument of substance in motion that enables it to act in subjects configured in time and motion. In this definition the intellect really and truly grasps the essence of time, and the definitions of principles and rules B C D E F G attest to it. Here the intellect must reach a very lofty and clear understanding, far removed from confusion and doubt once its subject matter has been prepared both subjectively and objectively.

Chapter 8 - Rule I
32. With the eighth rule, we will investigate the nature of locus by asking where the intellect is. This question or rule has fifteen species taken from the second, third, ninth and tenth rules. First, by the first species of rule C, the intellect is in its coessential and co-natural locus, namely its own being and essence just as man is man in his humanity and being. And by the second species, the intellect is a being in itself because its intrinsic parts constitute a whole. By the third species, the intellect resides in the soul, in man, and wherever man is. By the fourth species, the intellect is present in its virtuous habit of practical knowledge in the subjects it deals with, and so forth.
33. This rule asks about things located in space and things that simply exist without occupying any locus in space: for instance, the intellect exists locally by the third and fourth species of rule C, but occupies no locus in space by the first and second species of the same rule. As we just used rule C to locate the intellect, let us use it to find out what locus is: now, locus is a being whose proper function is to locate things with its innate locative, located and locating, and locus exists in located subjects as a habit, as in heat located in fire, action in the agent and so forth.

34. Further, let us inquire into locus with the first species of rule D: just as the intellect is primordial and not derived from any pre-existing thing, so is locus a primordial and general part of the universe. By the first species, locus cannot be sensed or imagined, but only understood. However, the figure of locus (not its essence) can be sensed and imagined with the second species. By the third species, locus belongs to whatever is located in it, just like heat belongs to whatever is heated and habituated with it.

35. With these three species, the intellect attains the essence of locus in a purely intellectual way as all particular loci sustained in particular subjects are deployed and derived from the universal locus sustained in the universal subject where the universal locus collocates all located things just like universal heat makes all hot things hot and universal motion moves all moving things.

36. Now let us investigate locus with the rule of modality: we observe that in elemented things one part exists in another part, like fire in air and vice-versa, and form in matter and conversely, and every part in the whole and conversely, and as the whole expresses its likeness or figure outwardly, likewise, one locus is accidentally in another locus and all particular loci are in the universal locus. Locus shows its figure in the container, the act of containing and the content.

37. We can find out more about locus with the second rule of K: now locus is an instrument of substance with which substance collocates parts in one another like habituated subjects in their habits, for instance good things in goodness, white things in whiteness, great things in greatness and so forth. And the figure of locus as an instrument can be seen and imagined where flour is located in water and water in flour, and in other things like this. We have dealt with locus and identified it by discoursing with rules C D K. The definitions of the principles and rules B C D E F G H bear out our conclusions.

Chapter 9 - The first rule of K, or modality
38. The ninth question is about modality, or the way in which things exist, and it has four species. The first asks how a thing exists in itself. And I say the intellect is a thing that exists per se, as it has a way of existing per se so as to be distinct from every other essence.
39. The second species asks how the intellect exists in other things, and other things in it. And the answer is that the intellect has a way of existing in the will, and the will in the intellect, as together with memory they constitute the rational soul.

40. The third species asks how the intellect exists in its parts, and its parts in it. And the answer is that the intellect exists in its parts, and its parts in it, through the same natural property whereby it consists of its own intellective, intelligible and intellection, and whereby these three correlatives exist as parts of the intellect.

41. The fourth species asks how the intellect transmits its likeness externally. And the answer is that the intellect can transmit its likeness externally through the habit of science whereby it understands the many things it makes intelligible in its own innate intelligible part. With this rule we inquire into the way things exist in themselves, and in one another as said above.

42. Further, note that difference causes differences, and as such, it has a way of distinguishing things; and concordance makes many things agree together in one composite, and so it has a way of joining things together. And hence follows the mode whereby parts exist in each other and the whole is in its parts : like in a coin, where gold is in silver, and silver is in gold while each metal remains in its own essence and being. This modality is a general thing that includes all particular modalities, and all subjects are its likenesses just as shape is a likeness of substance, colors are likenesses of colored things, and so forth. And moral modality is a likeness of natural modality. The things said here about modality can be proved and verified with the definitions of the principles and with rules B C D E F G H I, as any artist can see if he diligently applies this art.

Chapter 10 - The second rule K, or instrumentality
41. The tenth rule deals with instrumentality, it asks: "What do things exist with and with what do they act?" It has four species similar to those in the rule of modality. The first species asks "With what is the intellect a part of the soul?" And the answer is that the intellect is a part of the soul with difference, concordance, power and all the other principles except contrariety.
44. With the second species we ask: "With what does the intellect understand things other than itself?" And the answer is that in order to understand things, the intellect uses the species it acquires and combines together and places in its own innate intelligible part: like an eye looking at its own likeness in a mirror.

45. With the third species we ask "With what is the intellect universal and particular?" And the answer is that it is universal inasmuch as it has one active formal intellective power with which it can view many images. And it is particular when it descends to practical specifics and understands the specified species it has acquired and stored in memory.

46. With the fourth species we ask: "With what does the intellect transmit its likeness externally?" And the answer is that the intellect transmits its own likeness externally with its own intellective, intelligible and intellection, with which it makes species which it understands, the memory remembers and the will chooses to love or hate. This rule serves to inquire about spiritual and corporeal instruments.

47. Further, some instruments are substantial, like the instrument of procreation with which breeders generate offspring: others are accidental, like fire that heats heatable things with its heat, and like man who justifies himself with justice.

Universal instruments are used, for instance, when the intellect uses its own intelligible part to make various foreign things intelligible, or when a breeder generates many offspring with one and the same instrument, just as fire heats many heatable things with its heat, or a blacksmith makes many nails with the same hammer.

Particular instruments are, for instance: the various articles with which a builder builds a house; and two propositions that lead to a conclusion; and so on with other similar things in their own way.

And there are intrinsic instruments, like the intelligible part of the intellect which is of its own essence; and there are other, extrinsic instruments external to the intellect that teachers use to teach science, like blacksmiths use hammers to make nails.

All the definitions of the principles of this art and all the rules attest and prove the truth of what we said about instrumentality. And the same applies to what we said about the ten rules, which are like vessels disposed to receive whatever the human intellect can understand in a way proportioned to it.

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